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1. Introduction
Is the Treaty of Lisbon a threat to European federalism? Perhaps, following the recent 
developments in Ireland the Czech Republic and Poland, some might consider this 
question little more than academic. However, if the evidence provided by the crises 
following the Irish rejection of the Nice Treaty or the Dutch and French rejections 
of the European Constitution are anything to go by, it is pretty likely that in the not 
too distant future the Lisbon Treaty - as it stands, or rebranded and slightly amen-
ded - is likely to become the basis on which the EU operates for the next stage of 
its development. Thus the Lisbon Treaty hasn’t stopped being important.
What, then, might be meant by a claim that the Lisbon Treaty represents a threat 
to federalism? ‘Federalism’ is a term frequently used imprecisely in the context of 
development in the EU. This can lead to considerable confusion. In the UK refe-
rences to EU ‘federalism’ tend to imply centralisation and the aim of a ‘United States 
of Europe’ with a strong central government and increasingly impotent national 
governments. This is a distortion of the traditional usage of ‘federal’ to refer to 
an organisation in which “final authority is divided between sub-units and a cen-
tre”1. However, in some ways it is not as much of a distortion as it might appear: 
the creation of a European federal state would involve not only a change in the 
theoretical location of sovereignty but a degree of centralisation unprecedented 
in the EU’s history.
This suggests the first, rather simple, answer one might give to the question of 
whether the Lisbon Treaty threatens European federalism: namely that it cannot 
because there is none. I can’t imagine that I would need to provide much evidence 
to convince anyone here that the EU is neither currently a federal state nor about 
to become one as a result of the current reform process. Whether one looks to the 
existence of multiple currencies within the EU, to the absence of any real system 
of pan-European wealth redistribution, to the almost complete lack of centralised 
enforcement powers, or to the ability of some members of the EU to go to war 
while the others do not, it should be clear that the EU is rightly understood as an 
organisation of states and not as a state in its own right.
However, academics coming from a comparative federalism perspective often claim 
that the EU can be fruitfully analysed as if it were a federal state. The reason that 
the comparative federalism paradigm can sometimes prove useful in the context 
1 Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
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of the EU is that the division of powers between central European institutions and 
strong member state institutions has much in common with the division of autho-
rity within federal states between the federal government and sub-unit authorities 
that have important powers and privileges.
Does this mean that the EU should be understood as a federal organisation? As I 
see it there are two reasons why one might be interested in this question. Firstly, 
like comparative federalism scholars, one might want to find out whether modelling 
the EU as a federation will be fruitful from the point of view of describing develop-
ments that have occurred in the EU’s history, and predicting future developments. 
Alternatively, one might have in mind federalism as a normative ideal that the EU 
could be measured against. When we ask whether the Lisbon Treaty is a threat to 
federalism it is this second normative conception that is relevant.
What, then, does this ideal amount to? A federal system isn’t necessarily superior 
to all others. However, when – as in the case of the EU – political entities decide 
to form a Union a federal system with divided authority gains normative appeal. 
We consider the pre-existing entities that formed the Union to have normative 
and legal rights to community self-determination, and thus to have the right to set 
the conditions under which they are prepared to enter into a union. If they do not 
retain some kind of authority once that union is achieved, there is no guarantee 
that those conditions will be honoured.
Thus in the European context we should be worried about a threat to a federal-
style EU because the member states agreed to form a Union on the understanding 
that it would be limited. They took it on good faith that authority would remain at 
the national level except where they had explicitly handed authority to the central 
institutions. A federal division of responsibility, in which the consent of member 
states is required for further centralisation, is the guarantor that this understan-
ding will be honoured.
Additionally, federal structures have a unique advantage in their ability to resolve 
conflict between the benefits of unity and the legitimate demands of diversity. By 
far the most powerful case for European Union lies in the practical advantages of 
unity in helping to ensure security and prosperity for Europeans. The need for a 
federal EU lies in the diversity across Europe of what is needed from and demanded 
of government, and the need to bring together a continent in which people conti-
nue to identify primarily with their nations. Such diversity needs to be catered for 
through the decentralisation of power in many areas of policy.
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Thus there seem to be two main criteria against which one can judge how close the 
EU comes to the federal ideal, and which one can use to judge whether the Lisbon 
Treaty is a threat to federalism. Firstly, does centralisation require the explicit and 
informed consent of the member states? Secondly, is power centralised only where 
the benefits of Europe acting as one are sufficient to overwhelm the prima facie 
case that the diverse preferences and identities of Europeans make it appropriate 
that policy making is left to lower levels of government.
While these two criteria are distinct, and I shall analyse them separately, they are 
bound together by a common idea. This idea is that in a multi-nation co-operative 
Union like the EU, diversity must be constitutionally protected, both because diver-
sity is valuable for its own sake and because the long-term stability of the Union 
requires that the culture and identity of each nation is respected.
The case I would like to present today is that while the pre-Lisbon status quo 
seems to aspire towards meeting the federal criteria I’ve outlined, it falls short of 
satisfactory in respect to both. My assessment of the Lisbon Treaty itself against 
these criteria suggests that it would be wrong to see it as actively threatening to 
European federalism. Overall, the treaty represents a small, but not inconsiderable, 
step in the right direction.
The real failing of the treaty, then, is not so much anything it does, but what it will 
fail to do. The disappointment is that the pace of European cooperation in some 
of the areas where it is most needed is likely to remain slow. The threat is that the 
treaty will grease the EU’s wheels, and placate the EU’s critics, just enough that 
radical reform of the EU will be delayed indefinitely, missing an opportunity to cre-
ate European unity on a foundation that safeguards diversity against undemocratic 
‘creeping centralisation’ in areas better left to member states or regions.
2. How can centralisation occur? 
How does the EU fall short of federal standards regarding the means by which 
power can be centralised? There are three main ways in which power can be cen-
tralised within the EU: through treaty reforms, through the use of the so-called 
Flexibility Clause, and through the interpretation of the treaties by the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). While the process of treaty amendment easily meets the 
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minimum federal requirement that there are substantial checks to centralisation 
from below, such checks are not sufficient when it comes to centralisation through 
the Flexibility Clause and through the jurisprudence of the ECJ.
2.1	 Treaty	Reforms
Major shifts in the distribution of powers within the EU have tended to occur 
through the signing of new treaties. Treaty changes require unanimity amongst 
member state executives, approval from the European Parliament, and ratification 
by member state legislatures. Thus centralisation through treaty reform is very 
strongly checked from below, easily meeting federal standards.
The Lisbon Treaty doesn’t substantially amend the process of treaty reform. Howe-
ver, it does clarify the process by outlining the procedure for future amendments 
to the EU’s governing treaties. It creates a simple system through which the Euro-
pean Commission, European Parliament or the government of any member state 
can put forward a request for a treaty amendment, which will then be considered 
by a ‘Convention’ of the ‘great and the good’ before potentially being put forward 
for ratification2.
An even more rigorous standard might require not just the consent of the institu-
tions losing power through centralisation but also the consent of the constituencies 
represented by those institutions, to ensure that they are not acting against the 
will of the people they are supposed to represent. It seems desirable that mem-
ber states should create checks against elite domination by requiring that major 
changes in national sovereignty must receive popular consent. However, given the 
diversity of attitudes towards referenda across Europe - ranging from traditional 
suspicion in modern Germany to their strong constitutional enshrinement in Ire-
land - it seems sensible that the requirements for ratification be determined by 
the states themselves, rather than being mandated centrally.
It might also be wondered whether European treaty reforms can claim democra-
tic legitimacy and consent given the opaque nature of most EU treaties. Anyone 
attempting to read the old draft constitution is struck first by its length, then by 
the impenetrability of its legalistic jargon, and finally by the labyrinthine comple-
xity of the cross-referencing required to gain any sense of it. The Treaty of Lisbon 
is even less comprehensible since it is in reality an amending document to two 
2 Article 48 of the consolidated Treaty on European Union.
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separate treaties, the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Union3. Given this it is scarcely surprising that most people don’t even 
make an attempt to understand it. This ignorance undermines the extent to which 
representatives at the national level can be held to account by the electorate, and 
therefore, arguably, the legitimacy of the whole ratification process.
2.2	 Flexibility	Clause			
It is too often forgotten that high profile treaty reforms are the only way in which 
power can be centralised in the EU. Competences can also be transferred from 
member states to the central European Union institutions through the so-called 
‘flexibility clause’4. This allows the Council to extend the competence of EU insti-
tutions if it is felt that their treaty derived powers are insufficient to achieve its 
core objectives.
Admittedly, this power is quite strongly checked. The Council can only act when 
advised to do so by the European Commission, the European Parliament must con-
sent, and there must be unanimous agreement within the Council. In practice this 
clause seems unlikely to be used very often since it requires such a broad basis of 
support within diverse institutions. However, it nevertheless seems an undesirable 
measure.   
However, the Flexibility Clause, in its current form, is still deeply undesirable since 
it epitomises the EU’s failure to achieve transparency. Many European publics have 
been denied referenda on the Lisbon Treaty partly on the grounds that it involves 
only a limited transfer of sovereignty away from the member states. However, the 
flexibility clause theoretically allows almost unlimited centralisation without the 
need for further popular or legislative consent at the national level. This represents 
a real failure to live up to the federal ideal, since while national executives must 
agree to such changes, the consent of national legislatures is not required, despite 
the fact that the Flexibility Clause could be used to deprive them of authority.
The danger is that the clause leaves national sovereignty at the mercy of the 
transient whim of member state governments, since while unanimity is needed 
3 The Treaty Establishing the European Union is renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.
4 Originally enshrined through Article 308 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
and maintained under the Lisbon reforms as Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union.
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to transfer power to the centre, the election of a new government which opposed 
centralisation would not be sufficient to ensure its return. Thus, I would argue that 
the Flexibility Clause is just the kind of feature that has tended to breed distrust of 
European integration amongst ordinary Europeans, since it fosters the impression 
that an elite committed to integration is prepared to use underhand methods to 
avoid accountability to their more sceptical publics in order to achieve that end.
It may be desirable that some procedure of this kind exists to allow the EU to adapt 
quickly to new challenges, especially given how slow and difficult it is to amend 
the EU treaties. However, some flexibility could still be ensured if national parlia-
ments could veto the competence transfer5. 
2.3	 The	ECJ
Another means by which power can be centralised is through the judgements of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The court has been instrumental in expanding 
the scope of EU authority, through extremely broad interpretations of EU compe-
tences. This is in line with the cynicism of academics in the field of comparative 
federalism who often predict judicial help for regulatory centralisation on the 
grounds that federal courts have an “institutional self-interest in seeing the scope 
of federal law extended” since this enlarges the range of policies over which they 
are the ultimate arbiters6. Notable examples of this centralising jurisprudence in-
clude its 1996 ruling against the UK’s appeal against the working time directive 
and its 2005 verdict that Germany couldn’t introduce legislation providing for 
temporary employment contracts for employees over the age of 52 since it would 
involve age discrimination8.
5 This would be effectively identical to the procedure which enables the Council of Ministers to 
move an issue from unanimous decision making to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) (i.e. the 
change requires unanimous support in the Council and majority consent in the European Par-
liament, and there is a period of time in which any national parliament can raise an objection 
and veto the change). Article 48(): consolidated Treaty on European Union. A procedure was 
adopted similar to that which enables the Council of Ministers to move an issue from unanimous 
decision making to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), if the change enjoys unanimous support in 
the Council and majority consent in the European Parliament, but subject to an effective veto 
by any one national parliament.
6 Keleman (2004).
 Court of Justice of the European Union, 1996, Case C-84/94.
8 Court of Justice of the European Union, 2005, Case C-144/04.
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The ease with which the ECJ has been effectively able to transfer powers from 
member states to the central EU institutions represents a sad failure to live up to 
the federalist ideals I’ve outlined. The problem is that the ECJ is organised in a fa-
shion that creates incentives for its judges which reduce the probability that they 
will neutrally interpret the treaties in the fashion that they are supposed to.
Appointments to the ECJ are made behind closed doors by “common accord of the 
governments of the member states”9. Part of the motivation for the absence of US-
style public confirmation hearings is a genuine fear that the judiciary may become 
politicised, and it has been argued that there would be a real danger of judges being 
forced to ‘prejudge’ cases under cross-examination during such a selection process10. 
However, the main effect of avoiding public appointment procedures is not to de-
politicise but merely to reduce public scrutiny, ensuring a one-sided politicisation 
in which national executives can manipulate the appointment process. 
The Treaty of Lisbon establishes a committee composed of former members of 
the ECJ & General Court, national Supreme Courts and other lawyers to “give 
an opinion on candidates’ suitability”11. This is a welcome innovation, as far as it 
goes, towards ensuring that the ECJ is made up of judges “whose independence is 
beyond doubt”. However, the advice given by this committee would not be binding 
on member states, and the existence of the committee - whose deliberations and 
advice would be in private - would do little to ensure the kind of transparency 
over appointments that I believe is necessary both to prevent abuse and to foster 
public confidence in the European judiciary.  
Additionally, appointments to the ECJ are for terms of 6 years, which can be re-
newed subject to the approval of the executives of the member states. However, 
this allows governments to exert pressure on the ECJ through their control of the 
reappointment procedure. The EU would do well to move towards longer, non-re-
newable terms - as has been suggested by the ECJ itself12.   
The problems in terms of potential abuse posed by unaccountable appointment 
procedures and renewable terms are exacerbated by the fact that the voting re-
sults of judgements cannot be published and dissenting opinions within the court 
cannot be aired. This creates a situation in which the court cannot be publicly cal-
9 Article 253, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union.
10 Kapteyn (2001).
11 Article 255, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
12 Report of the Court of Justice on certain aspects of the application of the treaty on European 
Union, Paragraph 1 (Luxembourg, May 1995).
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led to account from within, shielding majority judgements from implicit or explicit 
critique from minorities within the court. Such internal critiques would be a parti-
cularly useful check because it would provide for an apolitical legal critique which 
should ensure that judges know that if they let political considerations influence 
their judgements they may sacrifice their legal reputations.   
Thus the ease with which power can be transferred within the EU is undesirable 
from a federalist point of view. While high standards are required for treaty revisi-
ons, powers can still be centralised without full consent from national institutions 
through the ‘flexibility clause’ mechanism and through the judgements of the ECJ, 
which is unaccountable and, arguably, institutionally biased in a centralising di-
rection. The Treaty of Lisbon does not make things worse in this area, but nor does 
it make it substantially better.
3. Who holds what powers?  
I’ll now move onto the second federalist standard I suggested: whether a balan-
ce is struck within the EU between the benefits of unified action in some areas 
and the need to cater for diversity of preferences, needs and circumstances across 
member states. Given this diversity, and especially given the superior democratic 
credentials of national-level institutions13, I believe that authority should reside 
with member states (or their sub-units) unless it can be shown that there are sub-
stantial to unified European action.
In principle, one would expect competences to be divided along these lines within 
the EU. This is because since 1992 the concept of ‘subsidiarity’ has been enshrined 
in EU law14. Subsidiarity is phrased in several different non-identical ways within 
the body of EU treaties, but in all its forms the intention seems quite clearly to 
ensure that the Union should only act where there are clear advantages to cen-
tralised over member state or regional action. However, to date the subsidiarity 
principle has proved a paper tiger, which despite having become firmly enshrined 
13 Both in terms of institutional structure and in terms of the existence of the feeling of com-
munity necessary to create the ‚demos‘ on which democracy relies.
14 Currently through Article 5 Treaty Establishing the European Community and through the 
Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality.
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within the institutional jargon of the EU seems to have had little in the way of an 
impact on policy. 
It is true that the enforcement of the subsidiarity principle will never be simple or 
uncontroversial. It is inevitably a very subjective concept, especially given the vague 
wording of all the references to subsidiarity in the treaties, and the non-identical 
nature of each of those references. There is, for instance, a glaring difference bet-
ween the principle as articulated in the preamble to the Treaty on European Union, 
in which subsidiarity is taken to imply that decisions should be taken “as closely as 
possible to the citizen”, and that articulated by Article 5 of that Treaty. But even 
within Article 5 paragraph 3 there seems a not so subtle difference between the 
requirement that in order to be allowed to act the EU must show that “the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States” and the weaker state-
ment that the EU can act if a desired result can be “better achieved at the Union 
level”. The latter seems to imply that any efficiency gains are enough to ensure that 
Union action doesn’t violate subsidiarity, whereas the former implies that there is 
a violation of subsidiarity even if there are efficiency gains from Union action so 
long as the Member State could sufficiently achieve the desired result. 
This concept of ‘sufficiency’ and the Preamble’s resolution that decisions should 
be taken “as closely as possible” to the citizen are vague and subjective. However, 
something along these lines does seem necessary given that those who are motiva-
ted by subsidiarity are surely concerned with more than merely the raw economic 
efficiency criterion that is implied by a willingness to centralise wherever the spe-
cific aim of legislation could be better achieved through Union action. It seems to 
me that a belief in the value of the subsidiarity principle, and a belief in a federal 
division of powers in general, must also be grounded on a concern for democra-
tic accountability, for community empowerment and for the value of catering for 
diversity. A quick glance at the current division of responsibilities within the EU is 
enough to reveal that such a strong conception of subsidiarity is not being imple-
mented. Indeed, it might be questioned whether there is much evidence that sub-
sidiarity, on any reasonable interpretation of the concept, is having an impact on 
the EU’s practices, since in many areas where coordination would yield substantial 
benefits the EU does little, whereas it is often almost hyperactive in areas where 
member states are perfectly capable of acting efficiently on their own.
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3.1	 Where	subsidiarity	suggests	power	should	be	federalised...
There are a large number of areas within which central EU policy coordination would 
be desirable but national vetoes within the Council or a total lack of Union compe-
tence means that action is inefficiently left at the national level. For instance, the 
unanimity requirement for immigration policy coordination has hampered coope-
ration despite the need to resolve the policy ‘spillovers’ created by the absence of 
internal borders within the EU. The Lisbon Treaty would move immigration under 
QMV, making a more sensible unified policy more likely15. Similarly, the new shared 
competences created by the Lisbon Treaty in the area of Space Policy16 and energy 
security1, represent a sensible move that should allow Europe to benefit from the 
significant scale effects pervasive in these policy areas.   
In contrast little progress is likely to be made to redress the absence of a strong 
European response to environmental ‘public bads’. Despite the fact that the EU has 
a shared competence in the area of environmental policy it has not managed to 
harmonise policy in important areas such as fuel taxation where economic theo-
ry suggests centralisation may be required for an effective response to concerns 
such as anthropogenic climate change. This is unlikely to change post-Lisbon since 
unanimity will continue to be required for EU action in environmental policy that 
is “primarily of a fiscal nature”18, leaving EU action hostage to national vetoes in 
the Council of Ministers.  
The extent of EU cooperation is even more glaringly inadequate in the areas of 
foreign, security and defence policy. Here a high degree of cooperation would be 
beneficial due to the existence of large returns to scale and, potentially, considera-
ble externalities between the EU states19. However, there has been comparatively 
little in the way of institutionalised cooperation despite the official existence of a 
‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) since 1992.  
Some progress in the direction of creating a truly operational European CFSP does 
seem likely to result from the Lisbon Reforms. Symbolic importance can be atta-
ched to a new Solidarity Clause20, which creates an obligation for mutual assistance 
15 Though the UK and Ireland would have opt-outs.
16 Article 189: TFEU.
1 Article 194: TFEU.
18 Article 192: Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
19 Since, it could be argued, increases in military spending in France increase the security of 
Luxembourg: see Berglof et al. (2003).
20 Article 222, TFEU.
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amongst the European states in response to terrorist attack, and a collective defen-
ce clause21, which mandates the same in response to an attack on an EU member 
by another state22. However, the most important reforms are practical innovations 
such as the merger of the EU’s two foreign policy representatives23 and the creation 
of an ‘external action service’24. This should allow the European nations to provide 
a more unified voice in areas of common interest, thus increasing their collective 
influence on the world stage.
Additionally, the removal of the ‘pillar system’ and the introduction of legal per-
sonality for the EU as a whole25 should facilitate cooperation by allowing the EU 
to become a signatory of international treaties dealing with security and defence, 
as well as creating the potential for the EU to move towards having joint repre-
sentation on some international organisations where that would be in the interest 
of all member states26.
The treaty also introduces the concept of ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’2, 
which is effectively an application of the existing ‘enhanced cooperation’ me-
chanism to defence and security policy. This could potentially be a useful tool for 
allowing some states to push ahead with cooperation in an area where the unan-
imity requirement makes integration difficult. However, one might question how 
much difference it will actually make given that its sibling - the much vaunted 
enhanced cooperation mechanism, which has existed since 2001 - has never been 
used28. Additionally, the treaty provisions are sufficiently vague to make it unclear 
precisely what ‘permanent structured cooperation’ will offer that bilateral deals 
outside of the EU structure could not29. 
21 Article 42() TFEU.
22 Angelet & Vrailas (2008).
23 Article 18, TEU (consolidated version).
24 Article 2(3), TEU (consolidated version).
25 Article 4, TEU (consolidated version).
26 Berglof et al. (2003).
2 Articles 42 & 46, Protocol 10; TEU.
28 Tekin & Wessels (2008). However, there is no minimum number of states that can participate 
in Permanent Structured Cooperation, making it more flexible than Enhanced Cooperation for 
which there must be at least 9 participants.
29 See Tekin & Wessels (2008), which suggests that informal methods of cooperation outside the EU 
framework, are likely to remain popular alternatives to ‚enhanced cooperation‘ and ‚permanent 
structured coordination‘. Also, Biscop (2008), for an account that is generally supportive of the 
policy but which notes that the kind of ‚pooling‘ that it aims to achieve has already occurred 
to a limited degree between, for instance, Belgium and the Netherlands.
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The European Defence Agency, which was created in 2004, has had some real suc-
cesses in moving towards a more unified policy towards defence within the EU. 
Particularly valuable was its work in ending the exemption of defence products 
from the free internal market requirement of the EU30, which has paved the way 
for a spate of defence industry mergers within the EU. However, the EU is still far 
from operating a common procurement policy, and the Treaty of Lisbon doesn’t 
seem to move the EU any further in the right direction. Some further moves towards 
coordinating procurement are probably possible within the current structure, but 
it seems likely that for the foreseeable future defence procurement policy in the 
EU will remain fractured and inefficient, leading to needless duplication of R&D, a 
failure to take advantage of economies of scale and learning, loss of market power 
and missed opportunities for useful coordination in order to render defence forces 
of the states of the EU more mutually compatible31.
3.2	 ...And	where	it	suggests	they	should	be	decentralised			
While the EU’s impotence in these areas where coordination would be beneficial 
leaves the EU unable to fulfil its potential, the excessive competences and powers 
possessed by it in other areas represents an even more worrying phenomenon for 
three reasons.
Firstly, centralisation reduces the scope for policy experimentation within Europe. 
Policy experimentation can potentially play a role for institutions analogous to that 
envisioned for individuals by John Stuart Mill’s advocacy of the freedom necessary 
for ‘experiments of living’32. It should increase the pace of institutional evolution 
by exposing poorly conceived policies to analysis in the light of innovative alter-
natives tried elsewhere and thus lead to better policy in the long run.
Secondly, unnecessary concentration of decision-making in the central EU institu-
tions may make the EU less durable. This is because the lack of strong feelings of 
identification with the EU means that European institutions are likely to suffer from 
extremely strong credibility problems if it introduces policies that are unpopular 
in some states or with some sections of society. Given diverse policy preferences 
between EU states it seems likely that centralised decision making will leave more 
people dissatisfied than policy making at a national level. However, even in areas 
30 Article 296, Treaty of Amsterdam. 
31 Hartley (2003).
32  Mill (1998).
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where there is little difference between the preferences of the European nations 
on aggregate heterogeneity of preference within each state combined with the 
absence of strong feelings of identification towards Europe means that the more 
the EU does the more likely it is that it will become deeply unpopular.
Finally, this lack of strong identification with Europe and the EU reveals the ab-
sence of a European demos33. The existence of a political community or ‘demos’ is 
necessary for decisions to enjoy democratic legitimacy. Thus the lack of feelings 
of widespread identification with Europe creates not just practical constraints on 
what Europeans will be prepared to have decided at the EU level, but also cons-
traints on what should be done by the EU given that it claims to genuinely believe 
in the importance of democracy.
Thus, the shared competence in the area of social policy - despite the many re-
strictions and caveats that limit the practical ability of the EU to set policy in this 
area - seems to contravene federalist principles in that it is an area in which there 
appears to be a large degree of heterogeneity of preferences across Europe and 
where there seem few significant benefits attached to EU as opposed to member 
state action. Indeed, a public choice theory perspective might suggest that the 
existence of multiple jurisdictions within Europe all with the ability to set different 
social policies should ensure competition to attract mobile factors of production 
that would check the ability of rent-seekers to harmfully influence government 
policy towards excessive interventionism34.
A similar logic suggests that the broad shared competence over agricultural policy 
goes too far. While a good case can be made for the EU having some authority in 
order to achieve a balance between the need to ensure a free internal market and 
the legitimate desire of some member states to preserve rural communities, this 
does not necessitate a Common Agricultural Policy. A common set of regulations 
governing maximum levels of protection for farmers could prevent governments 
from finding themselves trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario of spiralling sub-
sidies, and member states could then be allowed to set subsidies below this level to 
suit national preferences while facing the full cost of that policy. The Lisbon Treaty, 
sadly, but predictably, does not challenge the status quo in this area.
As I’ve already noted the EU’s powers in the area of the environment often isn’t 
sufficient to ensure that the Union can act to combat cross-border environmental 
33 Jolly (200).
34 Berglof et al. (2003).
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problems. However, the shared environmental competence goes too far in other ways 
in that it gives the EU the power to act in a whole range of areas where member 
states would be quite capable of acting effectively. Thus, the EU can legislate in 
any area of environmental policy with the aim of “preserving, protecting and im-
proving the quality of the environment” or “protecting human health”35 even where 
there is no international dimension, allowing for harmonisation of regulations on 
anything from “town and country planning”36 to the management of landfill sites. 
Again, the Lisbon Treaty leaves this status quo intact.
Similarly, the shared competence over transport policy includes not only EU powers 
that a federalism based on the principle of subsidiarity would grant it - such as the 
creation of “common rules applicable to international transport”, but also powers 
with a seemingly purely national dimension in which there are few obvious bene-
fits to having a single European policy, such as that “to improve transport safety”. 
The story is the same in the case of the shared competence in the field of public 
health, which includes both sensible union powers, such as that to enact legisla-
tion to combat cross-border epidemics, and one’s that would seem to contravene 
the principle of subsidiarity, such as the ability to regulate to ensure the quality of 
donated blood and organs and of medical products3.
3.3	 Why	hasn’t	the	subsidiarity	principle	had	more	of	an	impact?
Thus the distribution of competences and powers between the Union and the 
member states is often at odds with the federalist rationale that lower levels of 
government should hold power unless centralisation offers substantial benefits. 
This is in some ways understandable. While there actually seems to be considera-
ble support - on aggregate at least - for a European role in policies such as foreign 
and defence policy, control over policy in these areas also tend to be a highly emo-
tive issue for some, since sovereign control over them is often felt to be integral 
to national identity.   
Similarly, these are areas within which any residual distrust between the European 
peoples will make itself felt most acutely. Thus nationalists and others who are in-
clined to care about national sovereignty in general are likely to fight particularly 
35 Article 191: TFEU.
36 Article 192: TFEU. The Council would currently only be able to enact legislation in this area 
unanimously, but the Council could unanimously agree to adopt QMV-decision making.
3 Article 168: TFEU.
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hard to avoid centralisation in these areas. In addition, politicians who will hardly 
notice the loss of national control over workplace health and safety regulations or 
the rules on planning applications - since the technical nature of such issues tends 
to minimise the level of their involvement, anyway - will feel acutely the loss of 
‘glamorous’ issues such as foreign policy from which they gain much of their status 
and where their input into policy making tends to be more active. 
Thus the bargaining process that ultimately decided where power resides on any 
given issue will be far from certain to produce a result that is compatible with the 
federalist ideal I’ve outlined. Indeed, there seems to be an unfortunate paradox at 
the heart of European integration in that in many of the areas in which federal 
cooperation is unnecessary or undesirable it has already occurred or could quite 
easily occur in the near future, while in those areas where there is most to gain 
from central direction of policy there is the least prospect for it. 
This paradox will not be easy to resolve, but it seems likely that in order to achieve 
a deeper EU in the areas where greater centralisation would be really useful the EU 
needs to become looser and more decentralised in other areas. By concentrating on 
such core tasks the EU is less likely to be weakened by the distrust generated to-
wards its interference in matters that are of primarily national concern. It needs to 
regain the trust of Europeans by stepping back from any lingering ambitions towards 
‘ever closer union’ as ever closer integration. It needs to ensure that centralisation 
is achieved in a democratically accountable fashion, and it needs to ensure that it 
is feasible to renationalise powers, so that the stakes surrounding integration can 
be lowered with member states no longer feeling that they are being trapped into 
arrangements from which they couldn’t extricate themselves at will.
3.4	 Progress...		
Thus, an important and promising features of the Treaty of Lisbon from the point 
of creating a durable EU is the creation of a formalised and legally relatively sim-
ple procedure for leaving the EU, since this means that the states need not feel 
that they are walking into what may be a trap from which they cannot free them-
selves. However, more than just a legal right and procedure is required, for the long 
term stability of the EU. It needs to be ensured that leaving the EU is also feasible 
in the sense of not involving outrageous costs; for instance, through guarantees 
that those who remain part of the EU will continue to cooperate with and behave 
with restraint and fraternal feeling towards any who decide to leave. Additionally, 
cooperation in the important areas of defence and foreign policy must be pursu-
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ed - at least in the short to medium term - on a basis which retains the ability of 
members to act and achieve security independently.  
Thus the current direction of defence and foreign policy cooperation, while it is pro-
gressing unfortunately slowly, is desirable in that it has been focused on increasing 
the ability of the member states to coordinate their actions while not undermining 
the ability of member states to act independently to pursue their own defence and 
foreign policy aims. While some may be disappointed that the current reforms, by 
maintaining the CFSP as an area requiring unanimity for EU action, will mean that 
the EU will often find itself unable to operate under a common policy, this seems 
unavoidable given the diversity of attitudes to foreign policy among the states of 
the EU and the importance commonly attached to having an independent foreign 
policy capability. 
Indeed, moves towards QMV in CFSP might well reduce the long term prospects 
of foreign policy cooperation by creating resentment towards the EU from groups 
who disapproved of the policies pursued and did not feel bound to respect the 
community will as they might if decisions were made at a national level. Despite 
the prima facie desirability of EU control over defence and foreign policy from the 
point of view of efficiency and given the many shared interests of the European 
states, these factors must be balanced against the need to ensure democratic con-
sent in a continent where patriotic and nationalistic sentiment continue to ensure 
demand for state sovereignty in this area.
3.5	 ...But	not	in	all	areas!		
What is, regrettably, not addressed by the Treaty of Lisbon is the need to make the 
Subsidiarity Principle a practical as well as theoretical constraint on EU institu-
tions. It is my belief that ensuring that power is held within the EU at the lowest 
institutional level that is practicable is both desirable in itself, since it caters for 
the diversity and independent spirit of the peoples of Europe, and also desirable 
from the point of view of ensuring that cooperation can be extended and deepen-
ed where it is really needed and desirable. Achieving this may be difficult but it is 
also not impossible. 
The right to legislate is divided into areas: exclusively the responsibility of mem-
ber states, ‘exclusive competences’ in which only the central EU institutions can 
legislate, ‘shared competences’ in which member states can legislate but only if 
EU institutions have chosen not to legislate, and policy areas in which the EU can 
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act to “support, coordinate or supplement” the activities of member state govern-
ments38. It is desirable and fortunate from the point of view of subsidiarity that in 
all areas, where competence is not explicitly assigned, it is assumed to reside solely 
with the member states39. Exclusive competences of the EU fall outside the scope 
of the subsidiarity principle40, but this is largely unproblematic since the areas of 
‘exclusive’ EU competence are narrow and, with the exception of the exclusive 
EU competence in the area of marine biological resources policy, relate to the key 
functions of the EU such as that of ensuring a free internal market.
The real problem from the point of view of subsidiarity, then, is the large numb-
er of vaguely defined shared competences within which member states lose the 
right to action should the Union see fit to act in that area. Admittedly, in this area 
the ideal of ‘subsidiarity’ supposedly applies. All EU draft legislation which falls 
within the scope of a ‘shared competence’ must be explicitly shown to conform 
with the principle of subsidiarity using qualitative and, where possible, quantita-
tive evidence to back up the claim41. Under the Lisbon Treaty national legislatures 
have 8 weeks - extended from the current 6 weeks - in which to examine the pro-
posed legislation before it is sent to the Council, and if they think an act violates 
subsidiarity they can demand a review42. However, while one third of all national 
parliamentary votes are sufficient to force a review of the legislation43, there is 
no actual veto power, since the commission can proceed with the legislation if its 
own review finds that there are no subsidiarity issues.  Given the lack of strong 
networks of national parliaments it seems unlikely that there will be the kind of 
cooperation that would be needed to ensure that this system provided a real ‘sub-
sidiarity check’ on EU legislation.  
Similarly, cases can be brought before the ECJ challenging European regulations 
or directives that contradict the subsidiarity principle in areas of shared compe-
tence44, and if the court finds that a violation of subsidiarity has occurred, it will 
38 Article 2, TFEU.
39 Article 4: Consolidated Version – TEU.
40 Article 5(3) of the consolidated Treaty on European Union (TEU).
41 Article 5: Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
(PAPSP).
42 Article 6: PAPSP.
43 Article : PAPSP. More accurately „one third of all the votes allocated to the national Parlia-
ments“, where each Parliament is allocated 2 votes, with one vote allocated to each chamber 
for countries operating under a bicameral system.
44 Article 8: PAPSP.
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“declare the act concerned to be void”45. However, as already noted, the ECJ is a 
somewhat flawed institution from the point of view of accountability and immu-
nity from political influence, which means that it cannot be assumed that it will 
apply impartially the subsidiarity principle in its rulings.  
This is backed up by the almost total lack of engagement by the Court with sub-
sidiarity as a substantive principle in high profile challenges to EU regulations ba-
sed on violation of subsidiarity, such as the 1996 UK government appeal against 
the Working Time Directive  and the 199 German appeal against what it claimed 
was a failure by EU institutions to offer an adequate account of why regulations 
requiring a significant degree of harmonisation of credit-guarantee schemes was 
justified by subsidiarity46. Vassilios Skouris - president of the European Court of 
Justice since 2003 - has himself acknowledged that the Subsidiarity Principle has 
not left much of a trace on the rulings of the Court4, and I can find no evidence 
of the ECJ striking down a directive or regulation on grounds of a failure to com-
ply with subsidiarity. Thus something seems to be wrong with the current means 
by which subsidiarity is enforced.
3.6	 How	to	make	subsidiarity	more	than	just	a	word
In order to ensure that the subsidiarity principle is actually respected within the 
EU there needs to be both strong checks on central institutions from below and 
an ultimate arbitrator that is likely to be sympathetic to the importance of de-
centralised decision making where there are not really strong reasons for keeping 
power centralised. Checks from below already exist in the EU to a reasonable ex-
tent through the way in which the Council of Ministers combines being a Union 
legislature with being an organisation of national executives and through the li-
mited checks provided by the ability of national Parliaments to demand that Union 
legislation is reviewed if they feel it violates subsidiarity. 
Reform at the EU level could improve such checks by breaking the monopoly on 
initiative that the Commission currently enjoys over legislation, perhaps using the 
method suggested for matters falling under the Area of Freedom, Security and Ju-
45 Article 264: TFEU. Though, it may choose declare only the part of the act that is actually ultra 
vires to be void.
46 De Búrca (1998).
4 in a speech made at the 2006 ‚Europe begins at home‘ conference on subsidiarity (http://www.
ue2006.at/en/News/information/subsidiarity/skouris.html).
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stice where 1/4 of member states acting together can initiate legislation48, so as to 
make the repatriation of competences easier to achieve. Additionally, more could 
be done to ensure that national parliaments provide a forceful check on EU legis-
lation. However, there is also substantial scope for improvements through greater 
cooperation between national legislatures, and through mechanisms to ensure 
greater accountability of national executives as members of the Council of mini-
sters through better funded scrutiny committees or through Danish-style efforts 
to ensure parliamentary control of ministerial negotiating positions. 
The situation is less happy as regards the position of the ECJ as the ultimate arbi-
trator when the Union has exceeded its competence by violating subsidiarity. To 
date, as I’ve already noted, it has demonstrated very little concern for subsidia-
rity. Part of the problem could be mitigated by reducing the scope for judicially 
driven centralisation by moving away from granting the EU rather broad ‘shared 
competences’ towards a more explicit statement of what it is permissible for the 
EU to do49.  
Additionally, there seem to be considerable attractions attached to Weiler’s sugge-
stion of a constitutional council made up of representatives of the highest courts 
of the member states which would have the sole function of ruling on whether a 
newly enacted Union law violates subsidiarity50. It would convene at the request 
of any national legislature, national executive or union institution, after a law was 
adopted but before it came into force, in a fashion similar to the French Conseil 
Constitutionnel. The great advantage of such an institution would be that with its 
sole function being questions of competence and subsidiarity it could hardly fail 
to address the issue in a thorough and explicit fashion, and that - since it would 
be made up of members of national constitutional courts - its members would 
have a vested interest in ensuring subsidiarity was upheld. The burden of proof 
should be placed squarely with the central institutions by requiring that they de-
monstrate why the legislation doesn’t violate subsidiarity if the legislation is to 
come into force.
48 Article 6, TEU.
49 Though see Swenden (2004) on the disadvantages of comprehensive competence catalogues.
50 Weiler (199).
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4. Conclusion  
If, then, the Treaty of Lisbon does not represent a threat to federalism, what would 
its adoption represent for the future of the European Union. Certainly it would invol-
ve a real improvement in some areas: decision-making procedures should be made 
more accountable through the move to greater use of the codecision procedure; 
bureaucracy should be decreased through the streamlining of the Commission, lon-
ger terms for the EU presidency and through the merger of the current two major 
foreign policy posts into a single High Representative for Foreign Affairs; and the 
creation of an explicit procedure for leaving the EU should over time help increase 
confidence that a superstate isn’t being thrust onto reluctant European peoples 
by the back door against their will. QMV would be extended to a number of new 
areas and while the debate over whether this would represent sensible streamli-
ning or dangerous transfers of sovereignty to unrepresentative and undemocratic 
institutions, is a question on which there is likely to be little in the way of agree-
ment, it would be hard to argue that this move is either unprecedented for the EU 
or on such a scale that it would represent a fundamental change in the nature of 
the EU. Thus the Lisbon Reformers would seem to represent a pretty modest set 
of changes to the European framework; the EU post-Lisbon would be a bit more 
efficient, to a limited extent more democratically accountable, and a bit, but not 
really that much, more integrated and centralised.   
I’ve generally chosen to avoid the issue of what the Irish ‘No’ Vote represents for 
the EU, but perhaps this is the moment to touch on it. There is a body of opinion 
which feels that the Irish ‘No’ was simply the result of misunderstanding of the 
treaty and under-education about the benefits of the EU. There is almost certainly 
a measure of truth in this assessment, since the Irish No Campaign frequently made 
false claims about the treaty which whipped up unjustified fears that the passage 
of the Lisbon Treaty would necessitate large changes in Irish public policy. 
However, anyone who thinks that the EU simply needs to ‘get the message across’ 
and everyone will fall into line is, I would argue, somewhat naive. Concern about 
what the EU has become and where it is heading is both common to a large number 
of EU states and represents a substantial faction of the population in some mem-
ber states. Even more worrying for the prospects of the development of the EU 
in the longer term is the fact that the reasons given for opposition to the EU are 
often contradictory. In the UK concerns tend to be that the EU has moved beyond 
its ‘free market’ remit and that it threatens to impose what are seen as inefficient 
regulations, welfare or employment policies; elsewhere the concern often seems to 
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be that it is undermining just those kind of policies, which are seen as necessary to 
ensure social cohesion and combat the effects of globalisation. Almost everywhere 
there seems to be some concern that the EU may undermine local customs, or lead 
to the imposition of unpopular policies. 
The Treaty of Lisbon was never going to resolve such concerns simply because the 
treaty is not very radical and so would see the EU continuing pretty much on the 
same course as before. Thus while it might be possible to reverse the Irish vote 
through a re-run in a year’s time, in a repeat of ‘keep on asking until you get the 
right answer’ policy pursued to get the Treaty of Nice ratified, it seems likely that 
the barriers to the development of the EU will remain.   
In my opinion the EU could not survive as a federal state: fundamentally there 
isn’t the will at the present time, nor is there likely to be the will in the foresee-
able future, to overcome either the conservatism of the European peoples which 
leads them to be deeply suspicious of any radical moves away from national sove-
reignty. However, I also believe that only if it begins to adopt federalist principles 
more comprehensively in both its constitutional structure and in the way it sees 
its purpose can the EU fulfil its full potential as a union. 
The Lisbon Treaty fails to make any considerable strides towards an EU based on 
such federal principles, what might be called a confederation of sovereign states. 
Such a system seems necessary to reconcile the absence of a real European demos, 
and the heterogeneity of European states, with the need for institutionalised coo-
peration to solve the common problems confronting European states, which they 
often have real trouble resolving alone.
A confederal European Union in which the principle of subsidiarity would be of 
primary importance might in some ways do less than the current EU - with less 
power to harmonise regulations in areas such as planning policy or labour policy 
- but in others it would do more - whether in coordinating the European response 
to climate change or helping the European member states advance their common 
foreign policy interests more effectively. However, public suspicion of the EU means 
moves towards integration in sensitive areas such as defence seem likely to pro-
ve difficult, while institutional self-interest suggest it would be difficult to wrest 
back national control of competences currently held by the EU, even where there 
seems little need for them to be wielded centrally.
In my opinion it is judicial reform that could do the most to ensure that the EU de-
velops in a fashion that is friendly to the federal ideal of constitutionally protected 
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diversity. The ECJ is currently structured in a fashion that makes it easily perverted 
into a tool for centralising powers by the back door at a time when increasing pu-
blic scepticism about the EU limits the prospects for treaty based centralisation. 
Simple reforms such as making appointments to the ECJ non-renewable, opening 
up appointments and the voting records of judges to public scrutiny, and allowing 
minority concurring and dissenting judgements to be published would reduce the 
scope for the court to be used in this fashion. However, there seems little prospect 
for such reforms. Needless to say the prospects for a supplementary European court 
composed of judges from national constitutional courts, tasked with ensuring le-
gislation complies with subsidiarity, is a distant dream.
Thus while the future direction of the EU seems more uncertain following the Irish 
‘No’ vote, a good bet would seem to be that with or without Lisbon the EU will 
continue to evolve in a similar fashion to the way it has over the last decade or 
so, with powers slowly gravitating towards the centre pushed forward by broad 
readings of the powers granted to the EU by the treaties and supported by favou-
rable ECJ judgements.  This is dually frustrating in that it means that integration 
is likely to progress slowly in areas where the EU should be doing a lot more, and 
that in other areas the autonomy of member states will continue to be lost in vi-
olation of the spirit of subsidiarity.
With or without Lisbon the EU will remain out of the range of easy classification 
by political scientists, neither a state nor just an intergovernmental organisati-
on; with member states continuing to exercise considerable but imperfect control 
over the direction of policy; with powers distributed more as a result of political 
bargaining than of any general plan or theory; less efficient than it could be but 
not as inefficient as it is often made out to be; and certainly functional enough 
that European governments are unlikely to abandon it or radically reform it in the 
foreseeable future.
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